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WHY ARE RETAIL PRICES IN
JAPAN SO HIGH?: EVIDENCE FROM
GERMAN EXPORT PRICES
ABSTRACT
It is well documented that retail prices in Japan are higher than in other countries for
similar products. The two main competing explanations for this finding are: (1) a relatively high.
degree of discriminatory practices against imports and (2) relatively high distribution costs
associated with getting goods to the point of final sale in Japan. The first of these explanations
implies that foreign exporters should charge higher prices on shipments to Japan than elsewhere,
provided at least some of the rent associated with restrictive practices can be captured by the
exporter. For the vast majority of the 37 7-digit German export industries studied here, the data
are consistent with this implication. Prices on shipments to Japan appear to be significantly





and NBERThere is active debate in policy circles about whether Japan's trade regime is
fundamentally different than that found in other countries. In particular, many observers
contend that Japan's domestic market is unfairly protected from foreign competition. This
is believed to have an adverse impact not only on Japanese consumers, who must pay
higher prices for their products than they would in the presence of greater competition, but
also on foreign producers who must overcome the protective barriers. Some even argue
that this confers an advantage to Japanese firms in their export markets by allowing them to
subsidize activities in foreign markets with profits earned in the protected domestic market,
undercut rivals prices, at least temporarily, and gain greater market share.
The evidence that Japan's trade regime is different is not completely convincing,
however, and there has been a lively academic debate on this subject.' There are several
kinds of evidence that have been presented in past research on this topic. In general,
economists look for different trade rules, different industrial or trade structures, or different
behavior in markets, in assessing whether Japan's trade regime is unusual.
The starting point in determining whether Japan's domestic markets are more closed
than other countries' markets is to examine Japan's overt trade barriers, such as tariffs,
quotas, and other nontanff restrictions on goods entering the country. Japan's tariffs on
tradable goods are in line with most other countries as a consequence of their GATI'
membership. Skeptics contend that although Japan is a GATT member, GATT does little
to reduce nontariff barriers to trade that have been viewed as increasingly important in
recent years. UNCTAD data on the presence of nontariff measures do confirm that Japan
has a higher 'coverage ratio" than most other developed countries for overall trade, but this
is largely a result of global trade quotas in coal, which accounts for a high share of Japan's
imports. Japan looks similar to many European countries with respect to nontariff
measures on manufactured imports.
See for examplethe recentdebate between Lawrence (1993)andSaxonhouse (1993).
1Skeptics still argue that in practice Japan remains closed because of peculiarities in
its institutions and industrial structure that make it difficult for foreign firms to penetrate its
markets. Japanese linkages between industry and government are quite different than those
found in many other industrialized countries. In particular, anti-trust laws seem to be more
lax. The extent of vertical and horizontal connections between firms in Japan is considered
to be unusual. However, in many cases, these vertical relationships replace what would
possibly be vertical integration in other countries.
A third type of evidence is contained in econometric studies of trade theory, which
can in principle reveal whether the theories explain Japanese trade structure as well as they
explain other countries' trade structures. These papers typically use Heckscher-Ohlin
theory to specify equations which use factor endowments to predict the pattern of trade
flows. In general. Japan does not appear to be a major outlier in these studies, although
there is some conflicting evidence in the literature. The shortcoming of this line of work is
that testing trade theory in general is plagued by a variety of problems: measurement of all
the relevant factors of production, deciding which theory to use in specifying the equations,
etc. Furthermore, an unusual trade pattern in and of itself need not imply a closed domestic
market. This sort of evidence cannot be given much weight in the overall debate.
The fourth type of evidence that has been used in this debate is an examination of
the prices of goods and services traded in international markets. A number of government-
sponsored studies have concluded that prices of foreign-produced goods tend to be higher
in Japan than they are in other countries (e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, 1989).
These same studies conclude that prices of Japanese goods are not substantially higher in
Japan than they are in other markets. The evidence that prices may in fact be higher in
Japan is consistent with two alternative theories: (1) the market is relatively closed which
restricts competition and increases prices in equilibrium or (2) transportation to or
distribution within Japan is more costly (because of regulation or congestion, for example),
which leads to all products having higher prices at the point of final sale.
2This paper attempts to contribute further evidence on the openness of Japanese
goods markets by examining the behavior of foreign firms exporting to both Japan and
other export destinations. In particular, the paper will test for country-specific differences
in the prices charged by exporters to buyers located in different destinations. Since export
values are measured in the exporter's currency at the port of export, net of transportation
and tariffs, export price differences cannot be attributed to differences in distribution costs
in the export destinations. If high levels of nontariff barriers account for the higher retail
prices in Japan, then export prices charged to Japan should be expected to exceed export
prices on goods shipped to other markets. If distribution costs and retail markups explain
higher retail prices, then there is no reason export prices charged to Japan should differ
systematically from prices charged to buyers in other countries.
The basic framework used for this investigation follows Knetter (1994a), which
considered whether pricing by German and Japanese exporters on shipments to the U.S.
market was consistent with the hypothesis that U.S. product markets had become more
competitive in the wake of the strong dollar during the 1980s. The current application uses
panel data for each of 37 German 7-digit industries' exports to multiple destinations over
time. This data permits the estimation of pricing equations for German exports to multiple
markets, including Japan. In general, the evidence is quite strong that German exporters
charge significantly higher prices on shipments to Japan than on shipments to the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, even after controlling for the effects of exchange
rates and real income on prices. This empirical result is consistent with the view that higher
levels of NTBs explain higher Japanese retail prices. It is not an implication of higher
distribution costs in the Japanese market.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I describes how export pricing
behavior by foreign producers can help distinguish among competing theories of higher
retail prices in Japan. Section II presents the empirical model used to study export pricing
3behavior. Section III discusses the data, estimation, and results. Section IV concludes the
paper.
I.Retail Prices and Foreign Exports
The evidence that retail prices for similar or identical products are higher in Japan
than they are in other countries is quite convincing. As reported in Noland (1993), the
U.S. Department of Commerce and the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry conducted a joint survey of goods prices in Japan and the United States in 1991.
Prices for two-thirds of the 112 products surveyed were higher in Japan. Japanese prices
on average exceeded U.S. prices by 37 percent. Of the 40 products surveyed that were
made in Japan, however, only 30 percent of them were more expensive in Japan. Prices in
Japan were 1.4 percent lower on average for this group. Of the 34 U.S. made products in
the sample, 31 were more expensive in Japan, with an average price differential of 70
percent. Of the 20 products made in other countries, 19 were more expensive in Japan
with an average differential of 65 percent.2
At least two interpretations are consistent with these fmdings on relative final goods
prices. One is that Japan has a very protected domestic market for manufactured goods,
which reduces competition and raises prices in equilibrium. This is the interpretation given
to the data by those who feel Japan is guilty of blocking foreign producers from entering
the Japanese market. This view is used as a justification by those who seek to use
aggressive tactics to pry open Japan's market to imports. The other possibility is that
distribution costs in Japan are extremely high, perhaps due to excessive regulation or
congestion, which causes relative final goods prices to be high in Japan. There is no
obvious trade policy implication associated with this finding. It reflects much the same
2Theremaining 18productsin the sample didnothave a unique country of origin.
4phenomenon that causes costs of living to be relatively higher in urban areas than in rural
areas.
This paper will focus on prices charged by exporters from a particular source
country to buyers located in different destination markets. By focusing on prices at the port
of export, this work is able to abstract from the distribution costs that may give rise to
cross-country price differences at the point of final sale. Before proceeding, it is worth
examining whether the tariff and nontariff barriers affect prices charged by exporters in the
same way they affect prices at the point of final sale.
Nontariff barriers (NTBs) to trade come in many forms. The most common NTBs
are volume restraining measures such as quotas or "voluntary' export restraints
(henceforth, VERs). However, there are many other subtler instruments that may have
(possibly unintended) impacts on trade volumes, such as import licensing requirements,
technical product standards, minimum price systems, price investigations (e.g., anti-
dumping or countervailing duty), and price surveillance.3 These types of measures have
been proliferating rapidly in the wake of GATF agreements to reduce other more overt tradc
restrictions. These measures are also representative of the impediments that foreign
producers claim they face in the attempt to enter Japan's markets.
The more explicit nontariff measures will have fairly straightforward effects on
product markets in which they are imposed. In the case of a homogenous product traded in
an integrated world market, binding quotas or VERs will raise the domestic price of the
product above the world price. With homogeneous products, it is likely the quota rent will
accrue to the firm that receives the quota import license, since competition among world
producers will bid down the price charged to the importer. Consequently, with
homogenous products the price received by the exporter will probably be unaffected by the
3 Laird and Yeats (1990)present and discuss the entire UNCTAD classification scheme for nontariff trade
control measures.
5quota. The quantity of the product imported and total domestic consumption will be lower.
and the domestic price will be higher than in the absence of the quota.
Most manufactured goods do not fit in the category of homogeneous goods traded
in an integrated world market.4 Producers of these goods tend to have market power
which allows them to capture some or all of the quota rent. Thus, we expect that with
differentiated products, price received by the exporter will be higher in the presence of an
explicit quantitative restriction. This seems consistent with evidence on specific cases,
such as the VER on Japanese autos in the U.S. market.5 Apart from this issue of how the
quota rent is allocated across market participants, the effects will be similar to the
homogeneous products case: Imports and domestic consumption will be reduced and the
domestic price for the imported good will be higher than otherwise.
A good case can be-made that many of the subtler NTBs will have impacts on the
import market that are similar to the impact of a quota or a VER. For example, a minimum
price system is equivalent to a maximum quantity system when market demand and
domestic supply are known with certainty. A minimum price system also clearly allows the
foreign producer of a differentiated product to capture the rent associated with prices above
the unconstrained equilibrium. Firms that fear price investigations and the possible
penalties they imply may also behave as if they face a quantitative constraint. To avoid
harassment, these firms may raise prices and restrict quantities shipped to markets where
such policies have been exercised.
In general, the presence of any law that can be used as a tool to harass foreign
exporters selling in the domestic market should lead the foreign exporters to charge prices
that exceed what would be charged if no such law existed. The exporter will balance the
small gain in current profit from a slightly lower price against the potential loss in future
The empirical literatures on the aw of one price (see for example Isard (1977), Richardson (1978), and
Giovannini (1988)) and pricing-to-market (Krugman (1987), Knetter (1989, 1993). and Marston (1990)) are
rife with evidence to support this claim.
5 Berry, Levmsohn, and Pakes (1994) find that Japanese automobile producers benefited from the VER
imposed by the United States.
6profit should harassment begin as a result of a lower price and a higher quantity today.
Thus, most types of nontariff barriers in differentiated product markets will have the effect
of increasing the unit price received by the foreign exporter relative to what would be
observed in the absence of the restriction.
A second aspect of pricing behavior that has been evaluated in international markets
is the degree to which exporters adjust prices to foreign markets in response to exchange
rate changes, i.e., the degree of pricing-to-market (PTM). If firms face either explicit or
implicit restrictions on the amount they can sell in a foreign market, then the local (foreign)
currency price of the good will be invariant to exchange rate changes for the range of
exchange rate realizations that cause the quantitative restriction to become binding. Firms
will provide the (perceived) maximum allowable quantity at the market clearing local
currency price. While this market clearing price will be relatively constant in units of the
local currency, the price in units of the exporters currency will vary systematically with
exchange rates. Thus, an aggressive pattern of PTM may be a manifestation of binding
quantitative restrictions in the export market. However, the factors determining the degree
of PTM in any market are very complex (see Knetter (1994b)) and there is little evidence of
destination-specific variation in PTM (see Knetter (1993)), so this paper will concentrate on
price levels, rather than price adjustment.
The discussion of the impact of NTBs on price levels assumed that the effect of an
NTB on a market is more similar to a quota than a tariff. If the effect of an NTB is more
like a tariff, then the impact on exporter's prices is ambiguous. It will depend on the
exporter's perception of the elasticity of demand and how that elasticity changes with
respect to price. Prices charged by the exporter may increase or decrease and there is no
way of knowing how pricing to market would be affected by a tariff. This caveat merely
implies that the lack of any country-specific tendencies in export price levels does not imply
that the Japanese market is relatively open. If NTBs act like tariffs, they may be difficult to
detect in the pricing behavior of foreign exporters.
7II. The Empirical Model
The empirical framework adopted here follows Knetter (1989, 1994). The general
model of export price adjustment estimated for a 7-digit industry in a given source country
can be written as follows:
=0 + A, + Rx,,+YY,, + (1)
where i =1N and t= 1,...,Tindex the destination market for exports and time,
respectively, p is the log of destination-specific export price (measured in units of the
exporter's currency at the port of export), x is the log of the destination-specific exchange
rate (expressed as units of the buyer's currency per unit of the seller's divided by the
destination market price level), v is the log of income in the destination market and
01,Aj3,and y, are parameters to be estimated.6 The 0, are coefficients corresponding to
a set of time effects and the 2., are coefficients corresponding to a set of destination market
effects. The error term,isassumed to be independent and identically distributed with
mean zero and variance cr.
The model given by (1) is an analysis of covariance model in which the intercept
term is allowed to vary due to unobservable factors that are constant across individuals but
vary over time (captured by the 0's) and unobservable factors that are constant over time
but vary across individuals (captured by the A's). The primary factor underlying the time
effects is marginal cost of the exporter. It is likely that some common movement in prices
is due to changes in the markup over marginal cost that are common to all destination
6 Adjusting the nominal exchange rate for changes in the price level in the destination marketimposes the
condition that export prices are unaffected by changes in cunency values that leave the relative price in units
of foreign currency unchanged. Both the exchange rate and income series for each destination are normalized
around their means.
8markets. The primary factor underlying the destination effects will be institutional features
of destinations that vary across countries but are relatively constant over time. One can
think of these factors as determining the "competitiveness" of the destination market and
thus its average level of markup over cost. As written in equation (1), the model allows for
the response of destination-specific prices to exchange rates and income to vary across
destinations.
The errors in equation (1) can arise for many reasons. Measurement error in the
dependent variable is perhaps the primary source, since unit value data will be used to
measure prices. Many of the theoretical models of pricing to multiple export destinations
imply either non-linearities in the relationship between exchange rates and prices or that
responses are conditional on the nature of exchange rate changes, so (I) may suffer from
misspecification as well. Nonetheless, the linear fixed effects model seems to be a sensible
first pass at data from a wide range of industries. No single specification is likely to be
best for all of them.7
The main coefficient of interest for this paper is the value of A for Japan vis-a-vis
other destination markets. Estimates of A reveal the average percentage difference in prices
across markets during the sample period, conditional on all other controls for destination-
specific variation in those prices. In practice. only (N—I) separate values of A can be
estimated in the presence of a full set of time effects. Consequently, we will normalize our
model around Japan and then test whether the fixed effects for other countries are
significantly different from zero.
The discussion of how NTBs affect price levels was a static analysis that compared
the price in the presence of an NTB to the price that would be obtained in an unconstrained
equilibrium. The data do not allow us to compare these prices, but rather to compare the
7 In previous work (Knetter (1994c))I have evaluateda non-linear version of equation (1) derived from
restrictions on how costs and exchange rates affect prices and found the results to be similar to those
obtained with the linear model. There were instances of convergence problems and implausible parameter
estimates with the non-linear model, which may be attributable to the presence of outlier observations in
the unit-value data used in estimation. Thus, I will concentrate on the linear model in this paper.
9price charged by a foreign exporter to Japan with the price charged by the same exporter for
the same product to some other destination market. The unconstrained equilibrium prices
in each market will depend on the elasticities of demand facing the exporters in each market
and there is no reason to think they will necessarily be equal. However, there is no reason
to expect systematic country-specific relationships to exist in relative prices for a wide
range of manufactured goods for reasons that are due to the shape of industry demand
curves. Thus, systematic evidence that export prices to one destination were consistently
higher for a broad range of manufactured goods would imply that something country-
specific, rather than industry-specific, must be responsible. If Japan has significantly more
NTBs on the products in our sample and the exporters are able to capture at least some of
the rent associated with these barriers, then we should find that the fixed effects for other
destination countries in our sample are negative, reflecting their more competitive product
markets and the absence of any quantitative restrictions on trade volumes.
The statistical interpretation of the 13's is straightforward. A value of zero implies
that the markup to a particular destination is unresponsive to fluctuations in the value of the
exporter's currency against the buyer's. Thus, changes in currency values are fully passed
through to the buyer apart from any possible impact they may have on the common
marginal cost. Negative values of 13implythat markup adjustment is associated with
stabilization of local currency prices. For example, a value of -.5 meansthat in response
to a 10% appreciation (depreciation) of his currency, the exporter would reduce (increase)
his markup by 5%. Assuming constant costs, the price paid in units of the buyer's
currency would rise (fall) by only 5%. Positive values of /3 correspond to the case in
which destination-specific changes in markups amplify the effect of destination-specific
exchange rate changes on the price in units of the buyer's currency. The estimated value of
ywould be interpreted similarly. It gives the destination-specific response of price to
changes in destination market income.
10III. Data, Estimation, and Results
The data used for this study are based on destination-specific exports for 37 7-digit
German industries during the 1975-1987 period.8 For each industry, annual destination-
specific export quantities and values are collected for 6 or 7 of the largest export
destinations from Statistiches Bundesamt publications. In selecting destinations, a couple
of criteria are used: each destination in the sample has a floating exchange rate against most
major currencies (since the data originally were used to study pricing to market) and there is
an attempt to choose a sample with geographic variation. Given the destination-specific
values and quantities of shipments, destination-specific unit values are constructed over the
sample period. These unit values will serve as the dependent variable in this study.
There are two destination-specific independent variables in the model, exchange
rates and income. The exchange rate variable is constructed by first dividing the nominal
exchange rate (units of destination market currency per Deutsch Mark) by the destination
market wholesale price level. The log of the resulting series is normalized by subtracting
its own sample mean from each observation to form the independent variable used in
estimation. The log of the real income series is also normalized around its mean. The raw
data on exchange rates, wholesale prices, and real income come from the International
Financial Statistics publication of the IMF.
For each industry, the regression equations for each destination are estimated
jointly, imposing the cross-equation restrictions. The errors are assumed to be independent
and identically distributed. Errors are assumed to be uncorrelated across equations, since
the presence of a full set of time dummies in the model precludes estimating an unrestricted
covariance matrix.
8 Although there are 60 German export industries in the data analyzed in Knetter (1994b), only 37 of these
include Japan as a destinauon market, a requirement for this study. A complete data appendix appears in
that paper.
11Our main interest is in whether there are systematic country-specific differences in
export prices between Japan and other foreign destinations for German exports. Table 1
presents the estimates of country-specific effects for the United States and the United
Kingdom for a simplified model with only time and country fixed ffects. Recall that the
model is normalized around Japan, so Japan does not have a fixed effect. Thus,
statistically significant fixed effects for the United States and the United Kingdom imply
systematic price differences relative to Japan.
We first estimate the simple fixed effects model without the country-specific
exchange rates and income variables. The first two columns of Table 1 report the
coefficients estimates and standard errors for the United States and United Kingdom
country effects, respectively, in this simplified version of Equation 1. These estimates use
the entire data smaple. Columns three through six report the results when the sample is
split evenly in the time dimension.
The results for the simple model over the entire sample give a very clear message:
German export prices to Japan are substantially higher for most product categories in the
sample. Of the 37 products shipped to both Japan and the United States, there is
statistically significant evidence of lower prices to the United States in 20 of these. In six
industries, there is evidence of significantly lower prices charged to Japanese buyers. The
remaining 11 industries are inconclusive. Of the 33 industries in which product is shipped
to both the United Kingdom and Japan, the evidence is even stronger. In 25ofthe 33
industries, prices are significantly lower on shipments to the United Kingdom. In only two
cases are prices lower on shipments to Japan. The relationship to Japanese prices within
industries is similar for the United States and the United Kingdom. Of the two cases in
which Japanese prices are signiticantly lower than U.K. prices—glykocides and record
players—Japanese prices are tower than U.S. prices in glykocides and are not significantly
different from U.S. prices in record players. Automobiles is the main exception. Prices on
shipments to the United States either exceed or are not significantly different from Japan,
12while prices on shipments to the United Kingdom are significantly lower than they are on
shipments to Japan in every engine size category.
Table 2 adds exchange rates to the model to see if the results hold up when we
account for how German exporters adjust prices in response to exchange rate movements.
Including exchange rates strengthens the finding that export prices to Japan are higher in
the case of the U.S.-Japan comparison, while the evidence remains roughly the same in the
U.K.-Japan comparison.
In Table 3, the results of estimating Equation (1), which includes both exchange
rates and income, are reported. Once again, the basic pattern observed in Tables 1 and 2 is
repeated: German exporters set higher DM prices on shipments to Japan than on shipments
to the United States and the United Kingdom. Although some coefficients change slightly,
roughly the same number of statistically significant coefficients appear when income is
added. In fact, the results for the U.S. country effects are strengthened. Of the 37
industries, 24 industries show statistically significant negative coefficients, four
coefficients are positive and significant, and nine are inconclusive. For the 33 U.K.
industries, 25aresignificant and negative, two are significant and positive, and six are
inconclusive.
The evidence that German exporters sell at higher prices to Japanese buyers than
U.S. or U.K. buyers is quite convincing in the models estimated in the paper. In order to
assess the likelihood that this evidence reflects the impact of NTBs on foreign exporters, it
is useful to consider some alternative explanations of this feature of the data. First, the data
used to measure prices are unit values, as opposed to actual transaction prices for specific
product varieties, so destination-specific quality differences in the product may give rise to
differences in unit values, even though prices for identical varieties are the same. Second,
it is possible that each country faces the same nonlinear pricing schedule, but that countries
purchasing larger quantities face lower average unit prices. If Japan purchases lower
13quantities than the United States or the United Kingdom, for whatever reason, then the
average price paid may be systematically higher.
In order for differences in the quality mix of exports across destinations to explain
the findings of this paper, it must be the case that Japanese buyers purchase higher average
quality than U.S. and U.K. buyers of the same 7-digit industry products. Unfortunately,
nothing in the data Set can determine whether this is actually the case. Two facts do seem
to argue against this interpretation, however. First, the level of quality consumers demand
is typically believed to be a function of their income level. Since Japan had lower per capita
income than the U.S. and U.K. for most or all of the sample period in question (depending
on how one converts standard of living to comparable currencies), one would suspect that
this quality bias would work in the other direction—i.e., that unit values of shipments to
Japan would be lower due to lower quality product mix. The fact that they are typically
higher in spite of this likely bias is quite surprising. Second, the scope for quality
differences is likely to be minimal for many of the 7-digit industries studied here—e.g.,
chemical products such as Vitamin A and C, hydrogen, etc. Consequently, the data in
many cases must reflect price differences, not merely composition effects.
It is possible to examine whether the evidence is consistent with nonlinear pricing
schedules by simply examining the volume of trade between the Germany and some of the
destination markets and asking whether the country effects in our equations are consistent
with the hypothesis that average prices decline with total quantity of shipments. While
quantity variation across the U.S., U.K., and Japan can be informative on this issue, the
U.S. and U.K. tend to import more from Germany than Japan does in nearlyevery
industry in our sample. Thus, it will be useful to add a country that imports the same or
less than Japan in as many industries as possible in order to determine whether quantity
discounts may be driving our results.
Table 4 reports the quantity of shipments from Germany to the United States,
United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada, while the estimated country effects for Canada are
14reported in the last column of Table 3. The quantity data show that the United States and
United Kingdom are much larger purchasers of most German exports than Japan and
Canada. Hence, volume discounts may explain the negative country effects for the United
States and the United Kingdom in most industries, but not for Canada. Japan is a larger
purchaser than Canada in 16 of the 25 industries for which data are available for each
destination. In spite of a lower average import volume, Canada has lower average prices
(after controlling for exchange rate and income effects) in 12 of the 16 industries. In the
nine industries in which Canada is a larger importer than Japan, it has lower average prices
in eight of them. The pattern of country effects and quantity of imports across industries
does suggest that volume discounts play a role: the probability of Canada having lower
prices than Japan is positively correlated with the ratio of Canada's imports to Japan's.
However, the data also show that Japan's prices tend to be higher than Canada's even
when it's import volumes are higher.
IV. Conclusion
The fact that retail prices of traded goods are higher in Japan than in other countries
has been documented in studies on relative prices, including some recent joint work by
MITI and the U.S. Department of Commerce. Higher relative prices in Japan are
consistent with at least two popular explanations: (1) higher nontariff barriers to traded
goods and (2) higher costs of distribution in the densely populated, and perhaps overly-
regulated, Japanese market. This paper has attempted to determine whether foreign export
prices on shipments to Japan favor one of these explanations over the other. If higher
NTBs account for higher retail prices, then it is likely that foreign exporters are able to
capture some of the rent associated with such barriers and thus charge higher prices for
shipments to Japan than they charge on shipments to other export destinations. If
15distribution costs within Japan account for the higher prices, then foreign export prices
should not be systematically higher on shipments to Japan.
The analysis of data on 37 7-digit German export industries clearly show that prices
of German exports to Japan are systematically higher than prices of German exports to the
United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, for the vast majority of industries examined.
The paper considered two alternative explanations for these findings: (1) the effect of
differences in composition of exports on unit values and (2) the possibility of non-linear
pricing which could lead to lower average prices for higher-volume importers. Neither of
these explanations appear capable of explaining the findings of this paper. Consequently,
the findings are interpreted as supportive of the view that higher relative NTBs in Japan
contribute to higher relative retail prices.
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 Table 2. Estimated US and UK Country Effects from Equation (1), y=O
Industiy
semi-gold plating -.142 (.074)
selenium .319 (.244) -.003 (.105)
coated paper -.39 1 (.061)* -.086 (.039)*
aluminum hydroxide -.96 1 (.084)* -.3 19 (.O79)*
autos, under 1.5 liter engine -.176 (.038)* .186 (.054)*
titanium pigment -.275 (.042)* -.5 16 (.034)*
titanium dioxide .455 (.091) -.424 (.081)*
vitamin A .479 (Ø45)* -.157 (()43)*
vitamin C -.023 (.009)* -.045 (.047)
beer -.300 (.025)* .028 (.021)
synthetic dyes -.252 (.018)* -.138 (Ø7O)*
special dyes -.123 (.018)* .163 (.128)
white wine -.232 (.026)* -.057 (.020)*
aluminum oxide -1.18 (.068)* -.700 (.229)
autos, 1.5-2 liter engine -.150 (.O47)* .019 (.03 1)
autos 2-3 liter engine -.441 (,034)* -.154 (.033)*
autos over 3 liter engine -.050 (.022)* .004 (.016)
glass balls and tubes -.188 (.113) .373 (.085)"
glazed ceramic tiles -.261 (.022)* .117 (.042)"'
aldehyde derivatives .737 (.153)"' -.684 (.240)*
aromatic ketones .979 (.043)" -1.13 (.056)"'
hydrocarbons -.025 (.039) -.407 (.091)*
hydrogen -.667 (.027)"' .497 (.052)"'
cocoapowder -.324 (.072)*
sandals -.294 (.044)"' -.162 (.074)"'
women's blouses -.492 (.048)*
glykocides .640 (.020)"' .508 (.028)"'
glass panels -1.10 (.147)"'
semi-finished platinum -.360 (.061)"' .337 (.060)"'
ornamental ceramics -.133 (.109) 2.35 (.O97)*
calcium, barium -.694 (.116)"' -.587 (.125)*
olive oil -.192 (.102) .018 (.109)
inductionfurnaces -1.11 (.101)* -.702 (.108)"'
record players .859 (.196)"' -.246 (.114)"'
razor blades -.434 (.047)" .292 (.037)"'
pneumatic tires .004 (.072) .042 (.066)
platinum plating -.390 (.022)"' -.252 (.019)"'

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 4. GermanExportQuantities to US, UK, Japan, and Canada
Industry United States United Japan Canada
Kingdom
semi-gold plating 888,657 196,003
selenium 15,025 4,150 6,355
coatedpaper 402,429 661,622 86,296
aluminumhydroxide 80,048 53,427 8,880
autos, under 1.5 liter engine 30,479 78,810 3,083
titanium pigment 222,896 62,870 33,872
titanium dioxide 95,232 13,814 5,391
vitamin A 543,072 152,380 137,361 78,911
vitamin C 12,040 4,933 7,513 3,125
beer 764,045 217,400 13,298 23,127
synthetic dyes 78,021 50,678 46,853 22,252
special dyes 4,804 5,438 5,996 2,342
white wine 415,757 544,757 38,716 88,462
aluminum oxide 47,698 54,054 3,345 779,103
autos, 1.5-2 liter engine 163,114 131,388 18,679 19,045
autos 2-3 liter engine 112,890 42,044 6,347 7,176
autos over 3 liter engine 40,340 4,663 3,655 2,040
glass balls and tubes 1,684 272 866
glazed ceramic tiles 50,708 137,054 36,389 10,600
aldehyde derivatives 89,690 68,177 15,301
aromatic ketones 86,093 46,723 1,643
hydrocarbons 77,644 38,160 29,267
hydrogen 10,328 36,081 5,385
cocoa powder 50,429 11,057 2,731
sandals 406,353 324,822 65,304 35,403
women's blouses 705,534 56,557 315,287
glykocides 622,420 83,538 107,605 10,505
glass panels 44,729 7,243 22,409
semi-finished platinum 1,053,901 1,714,534 235,632 94,299
ornamental ceramics 4,621 6,560 266 1,126
calcium, barium 61,601 48,341 8,236 5,172
olive oil 33,187 45,610 12,731 859
induction furnaces 16,627 14,820 2,088 2,255
record players 1,601,148 723,093 324,534 119,582
razor blades 1,564,355 439,919 705,860 627,984
pneumatic tires 1,436,758 1,047,772 793,785 87,787
platinum plating 1,869,865 6,592,563 624,536 276,720